



NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE U.S. NAVY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM**

by

Michael J. Rak

September 2003

Thesis Co-Advisors:

David S. Yost
Kenneth J. Hagan

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2003	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Title (Mix case letters) The U.S. Navy and European Security: From the Cold War to the War on Terrorism			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Michael J. Rak, USN				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis analyzes the determinants of change in the doctrine and force structure of United States naval forces in Europe from the publication of the <i>Maritime Strategy</i> in 1986 to the contemporary post-11 September 2001 security environment. Four factors are examined as possible determinants of change: (1) geopolitics, including changes in the political and security environment in Europe; (2) inter-service competition for resources, influenced by congressionally mandated jointness in military operations; (3) the influence of key policy-makers in the United States political and military command structure, including the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of both the executive and the legislative branches; and (4) relations between the United States and its NATO Allies. The thesis concludes that certain factors were more influential than others in specific circumstances, but all contributed to shaping doctrine and force structure.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS <i>Maritime Strategy</i> , NATO, Operation Deliberate Force, Operation Allied Force, Operation Active Endeavor, U.S. Navy, <i>Sea Power 21</i> , Europe			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 61	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**THE U.S. NAVY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM**

Michael J. Rak
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Merchant Marine Academy, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2003**

Author:

Michael J. Rak

Approved by:

David S. Yost
Thesis Co-Advisor

Kenneth J. Hagan
Thesis Co-Advisor

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the determinants of change in the doctrine and force structure of United States naval forces in Europe from the publication of the *Maritime Strategy* in 1986 to the contemporary post-11 September 2001 security environment. Four factors are examined as possible determinants of change: (1) geopolitics, including changes in the political and security environment in Europe; (2) inter-service competition for resources, influenced by congressionally mandated jointness in military operations; (3) the influence of key policy-makers in the United States political and military command structure, including the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of both the executive and the legislative branches; and (4) relations between the United States and its NATO Allies. The thesis concludes that certain factors were more influential than others in specific circumstances, but all contributed to shaping doctrine and force structure.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: 1986-1995	5
A.	FROM THE MARITIME STRATEGY TO FROM THE SEA: 1990- 1993.....	10
B.	FORWARD...FROM THE SEA AND OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE: 1994-1995.....	17
C.	CONCLUSION	19
III.	FROM DELIBERATE FORCE TO ALLIED FORCE: 1995-1999	21
A.	THE U.S. NAVY AND OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: 24 MARCH - 10 JUNE 1999.....	29
B.	CONCLUSION	32
IV.	FROM OPERATION ALLIED FORCE TO THE WAR ON TERROR: 1999-2003	35
V.	CONCLUSION	47
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	51

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Navy played important roles in European security throughout the Cold War, and it continues to do so today. The role of naval forces in European security is frequently undervalued and has comparatively rarely been the subject of detailed study. This is because European historians and strategists tend to be continental oriented. In most European countries, analyses of military affairs emphasize ground and air forces.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze the determinants of changes in doctrine and force structure of United States naval forces in Europe since the 1980s. The period from the establishment of the *Maritime Strategy* in the 1980s to the contemporary post-11 September 2001 security environment is the focus of this study. Four factors are examined as possible determinants of doctrinal shifts and changes in force structure. The first concerns geopolitics, including the changes in the political and security environment in Europe. The second factor to be examined is the inter-service competition for resources, including the effect of congressionally mandated jointness in military operations. The third determinant examined is the influence of key individuals in the United States political and military command structure, including those in the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of both the executive and the legislative branches. Finally, the relationship between the United States and its NATO Allies throughout the time period is examined as a possible determinant.

Comparatively little has been written about evolving maritime security issues in Europe in the period following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, despite their intrinsic significance. The focus of most U.S. naval studies has been the Persian Gulf region and East Asia. This thesis offers findings about the roles and contributions of U.S. naval forces in Europe.

The thesis is based on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include Department of the Navy doctrinal statements, as well as essays and speeches by key members of the U.S. military and civilian leadership. Secondary sources include histories and analyses of operations throughout the period.

Each chapter examines the force structure and doctrinal shifts of United States naval forces, including the Marine Corps, in Europe in a specific period of transition.

The chapters flow chronologically, and are bound by major events that clearly delineate the beginning and end of the period being examined.

Chapter II begins with the implementation of the *Maritime Strategy* during the Reagan administration in the 1980s and concludes with the end of Operation Deliberate Force in September 1995. The *Maritime Strategy* provided the impetus for the building of a 600-ship navy in the 1980s. The focus of U.S. national security strategy during this period was on Europe, specifically a possible NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. The *Maritime Strategy* was the doctrine that outlined the United States Navy's role in a war in Europe. The end of the Cold War and the decreasing Soviet naval threat were among the catalysts for change in U.S. Navy doctrine in the early 1990s. Changes in political leadership and the evolving importance of joint and coalition operations in the wake of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War were also determinants in doctrinal and force structure change throughout this period. In September 1992, the Department of the Navy published *From the Sea*. This new doctrine for naval operations and its successor, *Forward From the Sea* in 1994, defined the missions of U.S. naval forces when they conducted combat operations with NATO allies in 1995.

Chapter III examines the period from the November 1995 to June 1999. In November 1995 the Dayton Accords ending ethnic conflict in Bosnia were signed. The NATO air campaign in the Kosovo conflict, Operation Allied Force, ended in June 1999. The relatively quick conclusion of the NATO operations in Bosnia may have been a factor in the setting of unrealistic goals for the United States and its NATO allies when Operation Allied Force began. While the scope of combat operations in Bosnia was limited to small geographic areas, those in Operation Allied Force were of greater scope in all areas of measurement. The air strikes attacked targets throughout Serbia, including Kosovo. The operations continued despite unforeseen Serb resolve in the face of the attacks. Although the United States and its NATO Allies settled the conflict successfully, the process of getting to the end state was more difficult and costly than expected. This chapter examines the roles of U.S. naval forces in the conflict. It considers the four main determinants previously mentioned, as well as the performance of the naval components within a joint and combined war-fighting environment.

Chapter IV examines the role of U.S. and NATO naval forces in Europe from the conclusion of Operation Allied Force in June 1999 to the present. Many challenges face naval forces in Europe today. While the Central Command area of responsibility is the focus of the current operations against terrorist groups, the European Command area of responsibility, especially North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea, is a region of great importance in combating current threats. Since the 1980s, when naval forces conducted combat operations against targets in Libya and Syria, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean have been on the front lines in combating terrorism. Since the conclusion of the Kosovo conflict, and especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Navy in Europe has been operating in what many consider a secondary theater. Alliance responsibilities, a shift to joint doctrine, and a changing geopolitical environment are among the current key determinants of the U.S. Navy's force structure and operational posture in the European Command. Today, NATO Allies have deployed naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean as part of their efforts under the mutual defense clause of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty¹ to honor commitments to the United States. These forces have been used not only in the surveillance of shipping; they have conducted boarding operations as well. Naval forces in Europe also have potential roles in preventing and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean and in theater missile defense in Europe.

The conclusion brings together the findings about the operations, force structures and doctrines of the U.S. Navy in Europe from the Cold War to the current security situation. The objective is to deepen understanding of how and why the doctrine and force structure of U.S. naval forces in Europe have evolved from the Cold War to the war on terrorism.

¹ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack against one or more members of the NATO Alliance is considered an attack against all members. The full text of the North Atlantic Treaty is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/text/treaty.htm>. 9 Sept 2003.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1986-1995

It is the duty of the Navy to maintain control of the seas. Russia can challenge our control of the seas with submarines and air power; both require bases. Early destruction of Russia's bases and denial of advanced bases to her will necessitate heavy attacks immediately in different areas. There will be so many demands made upon the Navy for immediate operations in widely spread parts of the world that fulfillment of all demands may well be beyond the capacity of the United States Navy.

Captain Arleigh A. Burke (1948)²
[Chief of Naval Operations, 1956-1961]

This chapter analyzes the changing roles of U.S. naval forces in European security from the publication of the U.S. Navy's *Maritime Strategy* in January 1986 through the conclusion of Operation Deliberate Force in September 1995. Conventional wisdom holds that the primary factor in the changing of U.S. Navy doctrine and force structure in Europe is geopolitics. In this period the major shift in the geopolitical situation in Europe was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Geopolitics is only one factor in the shift in doctrine and force structure, however. Inter-service competition for resources and the legislated jointness of United States military forces also constitute a factor. Decisions by both military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense and the Executive Branch of the United States contributed to changes in force structure and doctrine as well. Finally, the evolving role of the NATO Alliance in providing security in Europe in response to the changing geopolitical environment is a factor.

In the 1980s U.S. Navy doctrine and force structure were designed to counter a threat from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites. Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, first published the U.S. Navy's doctrine entitled the *Maritime Strategy* in January 1986. The doctrine called for an offensive strategy of naval warfare, focused during war on drawing the Soviet Navy into a global conflict. "The

² National Security Organization, *National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto for the Next 10 Years*.

Encl D, page 52, 1948. Quoted in Michael A. Palmer, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1988), p. 59.

central point of the *Maritime Strategy* was that the Navy would begin direct offensive action against the Soviet Union from the first moment of a general war in order to shape that war and turn it into a protracted, global, nonnuclear conflict that would take advantage of the geographic, political, military and economic positions of the United States.”³ The plan represented a strategic innovation, in that it called for expanding a potential conflict beyond central Europe. Prior to the *Maritime Strategy*, naval plans focused on keeping open sea lines of communication in the north Atlantic, escorting Allied merchant vessels, and preventing Soviet submarines from passing through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. These actions were all primarily designed to protect Allied supply lines, rather than using naval forces to directly attack enemy land bases on the periphery of the European continent.

The *Maritime Strategy* was set upon the premise that the Soviet Union would prefer to fight a war concentrated in one theater of operations. Specifically, the Soviet Union would seek to take advantage of its numerical superiority in manpower and materiel in central Europe. The success of the *Maritime Strategy* was dependent on drawing Soviet resources away from central Europe to the periphery of the continent, as well as forcing the Soviets to protect their assets in the Pacific. Prior strategy called for the United States to transfer naval assets to the Euro-Atlantic region. The new doctrine called for continuing operations in the Pacific region in an effort to force the Soviet Union to defend everywhere at once. In the Euro-Atlantic theater, maritime forces would be employed not only for merchant escort, but to actively seek out and destroy Soviet naval forces in the open ocean and to attack the periphery of the continent both from the Mediterranean Sea and the North Sea/Barents Sea area.

The *Maritime Strategy* consisted of two components, crisis response and warfighting. “Between 1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of American military forces, naval forces constituted the principal element of our response in about 80% of the crises.”⁴ Admiral Watkins argued that the mobility and forward deployed nature of naval forces make them the ideal crisis response and deterrence instrument. Naval forces have the ability to control escalation because they can be

³ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (Stanford: University Press, 1994), p. 429.

⁴ Admiral James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986, p.8.

unobtrusive, and by remaining in international waters they can reduce political sensitivities.

The warfighting portion of the strategy consisted of three phases: Deterrence or the Transition to War, Seizing the Initiative, and Carrying the Fight to the Enemy.⁵ The deterrence phase would include a forward deployment of U.S. naval forces to make the Soviet Union rethink its options and abilities. “Aggressive forward movement of anti-submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines. This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive early attempt to interdict our sea lines of communication and counters such operations against them that the Soviets undertake.”⁶ The deterrence phase also called for forward deployment of carrier forces and the periodic embarkation of Marine Corps forces aboard their amphibious vessels in order for these forces to be in a position to fight effectively should war occur.

The second phase of the strategy was, as noted above, “Seizing the Initiative.” Operating under the assumption that the Soviets would prefer to wage a conflict focused on central Europe, U.S. naval forces would attack Soviet naval forces worldwide and neutralize Soviet client states. Simultaneously, U.S. and Allied anti-submarine forces would attempt to negate the Soviet threat to sea-lanes.⁷ The primary purpose of this phase was to destroy the entire Soviet fleet. The third phase of the strategy was “Carrying the Fight to the Enemy.” In this phase American and alliance forces would continue to attrite Soviet forces at sea, while conducting amphibious attacks on the Soviet flanks. Carrier forces would attack the USSR’s periphery to compel the Soviets to disperse their forces, and thereby influence the war on the central European front. The authors of the strategy apparently believed that all of these operations could be conducted with the goal of preventing the conflict from escalating to a nuclear exchange while bringing the war to an end on terms acceptable to the United States and its NATO Allies.

The determinants mentioned above (geopolitics, jointness, changes in leadership, and the relationship of the United States with its allies) led to criticism of the *Maritime*

⁵ Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” p. 8-13.

⁶ Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” p. 9.

⁷ *The Maritime Strategy* refers to NATO allies and to other U.S. allies, such as Japan.

Strategy, and eventually its replacement as the U.S. Navy's doctrine. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 placed into question the need for a strategy built around 600 ships and global conflict. Moscow began to scrap many of its ships, and abandoned its own blue-water doctrine. As a result of this and a debilitating national economic crisis, Soviet and then Russian naval readiness declined rapidly. The Gulf War in 1990-1991 also caused U.S. strategists to focus military planning efforts away from a global conflict and towards smaller regional conflicts.

When the concept of the Maritime Strategy was in formation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986⁸ had not yet been signed into law. That sweeping measure attempted to unify the services, in part by reducing the authority of the individual service chiefs and the civilian secretaries. It also elevated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the powerful position of primary military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Department of the Navy opposed the forced jointness and interservice competition for resources that the act would impose. The strategy caused rivalry between the United States Navy and Marine Corps, and their sister services, the U.S. Army and Air Force. While the Navy and Marine Corps had developed the Maritime Strategy, the joint Army-Air Force AirLand Battle doctrine was implemented. The Goldwater-Nichols Act required centralized command of all U.S. military assets in a theater under a single theater Commander in Chief (CINC)⁹. In the European theater the U.S. CINC has never been a U.S. Navy officer, but always an Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps officer. This fact strengthened the influence of traditional continental-oriented European strategists. As a result, the naval portion of a military strategy in Europe declined in importance. The declining Soviet blue water threat reduced the possibility of a new "Battle of the Atlantic" scenario in which U.S. and allied naval forces would be need to keep the Atlantic sea lines of communication open in the face of a substantial Soviet naval threat.

⁸ "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." For further analysis, see Gordon Lederman, *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1999).

⁹ The title Commander in Chief and the acronym CINC, were replaced by the term combatant commander in October 1992. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld replaced the term saying that there is only one commander in chief in America, the President. Information available at

www.defenselink.mil/news/oct2002/n10252002_200210252.html

Military and civilian leadership changes encouraged a shift away from a global maritime strategy. First, the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would serve as the primary military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. Prior to the passage of the Act, the individual service chiefs had greater autonomy in communicating their viewpoints directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Under the new legislation, the Chairman presented either the consensus of the Joint Chiefs' opinions or his own opinions to his civilian superiors. Concurrently, the Act increased the authority of the regional CINCs, especially with regard to joint operations. "Formerly, and more appropriately to Navy thinking, joint operations were the result of compromise between the services. Now in a reaffirmation of the long trend towards centralization, the authority to conduct naval operations was specifically taken away from the Navy and put under whomever might be the appropriate [regional] commander in chief."¹⁰

Changes in civilian leadership also influenced the evolution of U.S. naval doctrine. During the period examined, 1986-1995, three presidential administrations, each with its own priorities, influenced military and naval thought. In addition, the power of the service secretaries was diminished by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the *Maritime Strategy's* most influential proponent, found himself first with reduced authority. Soon thereafter, he resigned in protest over the diminished authority of his position as Secretary of the Navy.¹¹

Many of the NATO Allies had reservations about the *Maritime Strategy*. The strategy could be seen as diverting the attention of naval forces away from the Euro-Atlantic region by expanding the geographical scope of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Some Europeans saw the strategy as a unilateral action plan by America that placed the defense needs of the European Allies in second place. The continentalist approach to the defense of NATO focused attention on the central European front. Any deviation from this plan was interpreted by continentalists as an abandonment of the primary focus of defending Western Europe. The strategy focused on the defense of Allies on the

¹⁰ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, p.444.

¹¹ For full explanation of Lehman's views see John F. Lehman, *Command of the Seas* (New York: Scriber's, 1988).

periphery of the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 6¹² territories, Turkey and Greece in the Mediterranean area, and Norway on the northern axis of the NATO alliance.

U.S. Navy planners argued, however, that the plan was similar to the cooperative coalition strategy first developed by the allies in the late 1940s and the 1950s. "Cooperation had a force-planning value. NATO assigned antisubmarine and mining roles to the United States's NATO allies, enabling the offense-oriented leaders of the U.S. Navy to answer in the negative the question of whether it should pay much more attention to low-value warships and defensive sea control."¹³ Despite this argument, NATO allies still found the precepts of the *Maritime Strategy* troubling. When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, European allies found new reasons to question the need for an offensive strategy. The changing geopolitical situation caused the NATO alliance to rethink its tenets.

During the late 1980s, owing in large part to the determinants mentioned above, United States naval forces moved away from the doctrine and force structure needed for a Mahanian maritime strategy. What followed was a downsizing of the fleet and a shift in doctrine to a littoral-based power projection strategy.

A. FROM THE *MARITIME STRATEGY* TO *FROM THE SEA*: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1990-1993

When Louis Napoleon at the beginning of his presidency [in 1848] proposed to Britain that they should reduce their navies 'upon somewhat the same relative scale,' Palmerston replied, not without embarrassment that it was impossible for England with her world-wide possessions to make her fleet dependent on the size of the fleet maintained by any one power.¹⁴

¹² Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states which land and sea areas compose the territory of the NATO Alliance for the purpose of collective defense.

¹³ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, p. 440.

¹⁴ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), 272-273.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself with a large fleet-in-being. Although it never quite reached Secretary of the Navy Lehman's goal of 600 ships, in 1987 the U.S. Navy had 594 ships.¹⁵ This number included 223 surface combatants and 14 aircraft carriers. Although the number of aircraft carriers rose to 15 for a brief period in 1991, from its high point in 1987 the U.S. fleet began a steady decline in the number of warships and auxiliaries. When the United States Navy published its new doctrine, *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*¹⁶ (hereafter, *From the Sea*), in September 1992, the total active fleet contained 471 ships. Of this total, 156 were surface combatants. All of the *Iowa*-class battleships had been decommissioned, and the structure of the fleet began to shift away from open-ocean operations to an emphasis on power projection ashore.

On 2 August 1990, President George Bush delivered a speech that would have far-reaching consequences for the future military structure of the United States. He spoke of "a world less driven by the immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war.... a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the need of regional contingencies and peacetime presence."¹⁷ The Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 further underscored the shift of American strategic thought away from Europe and towards other areas of the globe. The war revealed the U.S. Navy's weakness in mine warfare, sealift, and missile countermeasures. All of these shortcomings would be critical in building a force structure focused on littoral warfare and power projection. *From the Sea* spoke directly to this problem: "Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the littoral or coastlines of the earth. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas.... As a result our national maritime policies can afford to de-emphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas."¹⁸

¹⁵ All ship/ force structure numbers are from the Navy Historical Center Website. *U.S. Active Navy Ship Force Levels, 1917- .* Available at www.history.navy.mil 8 December 2002.

¹⁶ *From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992). Available at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea.txt> 7 September 2003.

¹⁷ Bush quoted in George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, p. 446.

¹⁸ *From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992), p. 1-2.

The doctrine stated that the new force structure would include “Naval Expeditionary Forces – Tailored for Joint Operations, Operating Forward From the Sea – Tailored for National Needs.” Unlike the *Maritime Strategy*, no mention was made of a threat to United States security from a specific country or alliance. The new strategy was capability- based. It dictated what naval forces should be able to do, rather than assigning these forces specific missions in a given political context. The new doctrine emphasized joint and coalition warfare. *From the Sea* reflected and shaped great changes in the U.S. naval posture and force structure in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Geopolitics, jointness, changes in leadership, and U.S. relations with Allies were all factors in the development and implementation of the new doctrine. The security and political environment in 1992 was decidedly different from that in 1986. The Cold War was over, the United States and its coalition partners had fought and won a regional war against Iraq, and the U.S. Navy was in search of a mission, especially in the Euro-Atlantic region. During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Navy played a secondary role in the combat operations. Naval amphibious forces were used only as a decoy, while Army and Air Force units conducted the majority of the combat operations. The Navy realized that it needed to become a more integrated part of the joint force.

In May 1993, the Department of the Navy published a policy paper specifically addressing the joint nature of the new doctrine. The *From the Sea* update entitled “Joint Operations” recognized the challenges naval forces face in operating in the joint warfighting environment. The document referred to geopolitical changes as the catalyst for a shift towards jointness. “Today, the absence of a global naval threat has virtually eliminated the need to conduct separate, independent naval operations far at sea. Our operational focus has shifted to littoral warfare and direct support of ground operations. By exploiting their access to littoral regions, naval forces enable the introduction of heavier follow-on forces from our other services.”¹⁹ The significance of this policy statement is that it purposefully melded the naval services into a joint Army-Navy-Air Force-Marine Corps team. *From the Sea* asserted that the maritime portion of the national military strategy was now part of the joint doctrine. Instead of having a

¹⁹ *From the Sea*, update, Joint Operations. May, 1993. Available at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ftsujotxt> 7 September 2003.

Maritime Strategy and the AirLand Battle concept, the overall United States doctrine would be that of a Sea-Air-Land-Space Battle.

In the European theater, the U.S. Navy immediately incorporated this shift in thinking into its routine. The Commander in Chief of United States Forces Europe (USCINCEUR) conducted Exercise Ellipse Bravo in 1992. The exercise was designed to assemble a large Joint Task Force, under the command of a naval officer, to be used in an emergency operation. The U.S. Navy considered the exercise to have been successful, in that in 48 hours a joint Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps task force was organized; and command of the force was transferred to an aircraft carrier at sea. From this sea-borne platform, an Air Force general, designated as the commander of the air component of the task force, operated successfully while embarked on the afloat command ship.²⁰ The importance of the ability to conduct joint operations commanded afloat has increased as the permanent land-based overseas United States military presence has decreased.

The United States Navy also specifically recognized the importance of allies and coalition partners in the post-Cold War security environment. In the fall of 1993, the Department of the Navy published another policy paper as an update to *From the Sea*, titled “Working with Other Nations.” According to the policy paper, *From the Sea* “recognizes the fundamental importance of establishing relations with security partners in peacetime before the onset of a crisis, and being forward-positioned to deter and react effectively to armed aggression.”²¹

In the European theater, the NATO alliance was in the process of adopting new roles. The Alliance’s new Strategic Concept was approved in 1991. For the first time since its inception in 1949, the Alliance’s primary focus began to shift to tasks in addition to the traditional Article 5 mission. The allies began to acknowledge and undertake non-Article 5 responsibilities in support of collective security. The importance of the U.S. Navy’s changing relationships with its counterparts in NATO nations and other European nations was demonstrated clearly in the revised focus of Baltic exercises and the establishment of a new standing naval force in the Mediterranean.

²⁰ *From the Sea*, update, Joint Operations. May, 1993.

²¹ *From the Sea*, update, Working With Other Nations. Fall, 1993.

On the northern flank of the NATO alliance's territory, the Commander in Chief of United States Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) had for years conducted the annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercise. In 1993, however, the exercise was conducted for the first time with nations which had formerly belonging to the Soviet Union or which had been members of the Warsaw Pact. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia participated in the event. The exercise "suggest[ed] that the expanded BALTOPS exercise [could] help cement improved relations among nations in the Baltic region – while also improving U.S. bilateral relations."²²

Since 1968, the U.S. Navy has provided forces to the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL). This NATO command was established to build interoperability between the naval forces of various NATO nations contributing to the unit. The SNFL consists of surface combatants that have traditionally exercised throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. In 1992, NATO created a new standing multinational naval force, Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM). "Building on the SNFL precedent, the SNFM squadron was commissioned in 1992 and promptly deployed to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with conflict in the former Yugoslavia."²³ The United States has routinely provided a surface combatant to the force which typically consists of between six and ten warships contributed by various members of the NATO Alliance

The creation of SNFM signifies two important paradigm shifts in U.S. and Alliance naval thinking in Europe. First, the SNFM is a force dedicated to the Mediterranean Sea, the model theater for littoral operations. Second, in its day-to-day operations, the NATO alliance has shifted from its primary focus on collective defense and Article 5 missions to an increasing concentration on regional security and non-Article 5 missions.

During the Cold War, the United States and its European Allies had a distinct commonality of purpose. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners were an easily distinguishable adversary. In the post-Cold War security situation, the United States has

²² *From the Sea*, update, Working With Other Nations. Fall, 1993.

²³ *From the Sea*, update, Working With Other Nations. Fall, 1993.

on various occasions chosen to defend its interests on a unilateral basis. Even before the end of the Cold War, a clear example of such a situation arose in 1986 when the United States chose to conduct combat operations against Libya. The United States took action without the combat assistance of any of its NATO Allies except Great Britain, and airspace over-flight rights became an issue that limited the availability of ground-based aircraft. *From the Sea* emphasized that the expeditionary nature of naval forces gave the United States a potent military capability in any littoral area of the world, without the inherent problems of land-based forces in foreign countries.

During the transition from the *Maritime Strategy* doctrine to *From the Sea*, the leadership of the United States changed. The presidency moved from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party, and President William Clinton instituted a shift in emphasis of American political priorities from foreign policy to domestic issues. Early in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ordered the Defense Department to conduct a “Bottom-Up Review.” The review focused on regional contingency planning and leveraging technologies to compensate for reductions in the military force structure. As an American analyst of defense affairs noted at the time, “The Bottom-Up Review is also designed against the backdrop of a reduced commitment of United States resources to defense overall.”²⁴ The review identified ethnic conflict and weapons proliferation as major challenges in the future. Early in the first Clinton Administration, the number of U.S. forces permanently deployed to Europe continued to decrease. This cost-saving measure became necessary because of the changes in the geopolitical environment and a shrinking defense budget. According to an American analyst at the time, “faced with the need to reduce further the costs of the U.S. basing infrastructure – and the prospect that U.S. forces may not always be welcomed in Europe – Congress may be less and less disposed to support the equivalent of an Army corps deployment on the ground in Europe.”²⁵ U.S. naval forces would be obliged to serve as the primary means of forward presence in Europe. Secretary Aspin acknowledged this fact during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in

²⁴ Jacquelyn K. Davis, *Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), p. 1.

²⁵ Jacquelyn K. Davis, *Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century*, p.13.

January 1993. “Our naval forces should be sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the many other important tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, deterrence and crisis control.”²⁶

During the administration of President William Clinton, the general trend of United States military policy was to avoid the use of ground forces whenever possible. At the outset of his administration, President Clinton emphasized that naval and air power were the primary choices for any U.S. military response or presence mission. He underscored the importance of naval forces in crisis response in a speech on 12 March 1993. “When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is: ‘Where is the nearest carrier?’”²⁷

In the wake of the casualties suffered by Task Force Ranger in Somalia in October 1993²⁸, when 18 Americans were killed in action while trying to capture a Somali warlord, and the resulting political fallout, the Clinton administration became even more hesitant to commit ground forces into any contested area of the world. With the administration’s aversion to casualties, notably in ground force operations, the United States turned to air and naval power as its primary means of crisis response and forward presence.

This shift had consequences in United States relations with NATO allies. In 1992-1995, some of the NATO European nations (mainly France and the United Kingdom) provided forces under United Nations Security Council mandates to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. During these years the United States minimized its commitment of ground forces to Bosnia. Bush and Clinton administration officials made reference to Bosnia as a potential Vietnam. Officials used such terms as “quagmire” and “slippery slope” when referring to possible ground troop deployments to the Balkans. “A countervailing concern during the period from 1992 to mid-1995 was that, if the United States continued to limit its military involvement in the conflict to air

²⁶ Prepared testimony of Les Aspin from 15 January 1993, quoted in Jacquelyn K. Davis, *Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 17.

²⁷ President Clinton’s speech aboard *U.S.S Theodore Roosevelt*, quoted in Jacquelyn K. Davis, *Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century*, p.21.

²⁸ For a full explanation see Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

and naval operations while pushing for firmer action on the ground, this could cause the Alliance to unravel.”²⁹ The United States limited its participation to Operation Sharp Guard, the embargo enforcement against the former Yugoslavia, and to air power in enforcing no-fly zones in Bosnia.

B. FORWARD...FROM THE SEA AND OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1994-1995

In 1993, the United States Navy consisted of 454 active ships. This number would continue to drop throughout the Clinton administration. By 1994, the U.S. Navy had 12 active carriers, its smallest number since 1941. By contrast, the navy’s new emphasis on littoral warfare was seen in the rise in the number of mine warfare and patrol vessels in the early 1990s. In September 1992, the active navy force included 6 patrol ships and 16 mine warfare vessels. By September 1995, the active force had 12 patrol ships and 18 mine warfare vessels. The number of mine warfare ships would continue to grow to a high of 29 vessels in 1999. The U.S. Navy also introduced new classes of amphibious ships in an attempt to modernize that portion of its fleet. The number of destroyers, cruisers and other surface warships continued to decline, from 156 in 1992 to a new low of 128 in September 1994, the lowest such total since 1931.³⁰

Published by the Department of the Navy in September 1994, *Forward From the Sea* was intended to update and expand upon the *From the Sea* concept published in 1992. This new doctrine did not dramatically shift the direction of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps; it merely reinvigorated the principles previously set forth of emphasizing the littorals, expeditionary warfare, forward presence and regional conflict. *Forward From the Sea* focused on allied and coalition operations and specifically mentioned relations with America’s NATO allies and members of the Partnership for Peace. “Participation in both NATO Standing Naval Forces and in a variety of exercises with the navies, air forces, and coalition partners around the Pacific rim, Norwegian Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Mediterranean basin provide solid foundations for sustaining interoperability

²⁹ David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 197.

³⁰ All ship/force structure numbers are from the Navy Historical Center Website. *U.S. Active Navy Ship Force Levels, 1917- .* Available at www.history.navy.mil 8 December, 2002.

with our friends and allies.”³¹ The document also made reference to the success of the first naval exercises conducted with former Warsaw Pact nations. “The outreach to the former Warsaw Pact countries in the NATO Partnership for Peace program will further build solidarity and interoperability.”³² In 1994 the U.S. Navy had participated in naval exercises that included forces from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

In 1994-1995 the role of the NATO Alliance in European security changed as a result of the Alliance’s first use of deadly force in 1994 and the conduct of Operation Deliberate Force in 1995. This operation had several key features involving the use of U.S. naval forces. First, the NATO forces operated under the command of Admiral Leighton Smith, USN, then responsible for Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He was the first man to command NATO forces in combat in the Alliance’s history. Second, naval forces provided key components to the action, including carrier-based aircraft and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strikes. U.S. naval air forces also provided the majority of electronic attack sorties in the operations. The operation was a vindication of the *From the Sea* concept. U.S. naval forces were on the scene at the start of hostilities because of their forward deployed status, and were able to project power ashore to end regional ethnic conflict in a littoral region.

The greatest revolution in strategic thinking as a result of Operation Deliberate Force was not its impact on naval doctrine or force structure, but rather the reorientation of NATO from an emphasis on collective defense to peace enforcement operations. A precedent had been set for the conduct of non-Article 5 missions on the periphery of the Alliance. Another effect of Operation Deliberate Force was a realization by the NATO Alliance that the United States was still the critical player in European security. “Deliberate Force ... illustrated that a sustained NATO combat expedition is impossible without U.S. muscle: Satellite intelligence, electronic jamming, and other technological contributions were virtually all American, and the United States flew two-thirds of all aircraft sorties.”³³

³¹ *Forward From the Sea*, 3.

³² *Forward From the Sea*, 4.

³³Rick Atkinson, “With Deliberate Force in Bosnia.” *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, November 27-December 3, 1995, p. 6. Quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 212.

C. CONCLUSION

The United States Navy's role in European security from 1986 to 1995 involved a dynamic transformation. The conventional wisdom is that the changing geopolitical environment in Europe is the primary cause of changes in the navy's doctrine and force structure. Other factors, however, were also important catalysts in this shift. The changing leadership of the United States government, particularly in the Department of the Navy and Department of Defense, was a factor in the navy's shifting posture. Throughout the period, the United States military shifted its overall organization toward a joint posture and force structure. Finally, the changing role of the NATO alliance in providing security in the Euro-Atlantic region influenced the structure and doctrinal changes of the U.S. Navy. In 1986, the U.S. Navy consisted of 583 ships. Its doctrine and force structure were designed to confront a known enemy, the Soviet Union, on the open ocean. The navy's structure and doctrine were threat-based. By the end of 1995, the U.S. Navy had an active force of 392 ships. The navy's doctrine had shifted away from an emphasis on open ocean warfare towards an expeditionary force designed to operate in the littorals and to project power ashore. A shrinking defense budget, leadership changes, and a dynamic European security environment had changed the U.S. Navy's European posture and force structure to a capabilities-based force.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. FROM DELIBERATE FORCE TO ALLIED FORCE: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1995-1999

In 1995, the United States Navy participated in the first large-scale combat operations in NATO's history. The military actions carried out by the United States and its Allies in Operation Deliberate Force made for a quick end to the long ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and led to the signing of the Dayton peace accords in Paris on 14 December 1995. Soon thereafter, United States military planners and civilian leaders focused the majority of their collective attention on areas outside Europe. Combat operations in the Middle East, following the 1998 dismissal of the UN weapons inspectors from Iraq, and growing tensions on the Korean peninsula were the focus of American expeditionary forces. The importance of Europe as a potential major theater of war shrank in the post-Deliberate Force military. Less than 4 years later, however, NATO forces, including the United States Navy, were once again engaged in combat operations in Southeastern Europe. Operation Allied Force would prove to be larger, longer, and more difficult than expected. It drained the U.S. Navy of its precious supplies of precision weapons, and brought into question the Navy's ability to retain adequate multi-theater global reach with its reduced force structure.

During the period from December 1995 to June 1999, the military and civilian leadership of the United States underwent some changes. Although these changes were not as drastic as those seen in the period covered in the previous chapter, they did have an impact on the way United States military forces, specifically the Navy, were employed. During this time, the geopolitical environment in the European Command and the other major combatant commands also changed, forcing a rethinking of naval force deployments. Finally, the lessons learned from both the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 and Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 were used to organize the armed forces, particularly the Navy and the Air Force, into a more efficient joint team. All of these factors, as well as the even greater emphasis placed on information warfare as the 1990s drew to a close, resulted in changes in the Navy's overall force structure and doctrine. Each of the determinants considered in the previous chapter – geopolitics, jointness, the relationships between the United States and its allies, and the military and civilian

leadership of America – will once again be examined in this survey of the changes in the doctrine and force structure of the United States Navy in Europe during the period from late 1995 through Operation Allied Force in March-June 1999.

At the close of 1995 and during the early part of 1996, the geopolitical situation facing the United States and its key allies was relatively calm. The emergence of new states and regimes in Europe and Central Asia in the wake of the Cold War had for the most part been peaceful. In the Middle East, the Navy and the Air Force continued to patrol the southern and northern no fly zones in Iraq, while United States and coalition warships patrolled the Persian Gulf in support of the United Nations embargo against Iraq. At this point United Nations weapons inspectors were carrying out their task in Iraq with reasonable cooperation from the Saddam Hussein regime, although Iraqi cooperation became more restrained after March 1996 and was cut back significantly in January 1998. The Pacific theater was relatively quiet; and Europe seemed to be enjoying a period of quiet as well, with the end of ethnic fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the domestic front, the United States economy was strong, and President Clinton was reelected to his second term in November 1996.

The bombing of the Khobar Towers –buildings housing American military personnel in Saudi Arabia– in June 1996 shattered the calm. The attack on the Khobar towers and the August 1998 bombings of two American embassies in East Africa ushered in a new period of conflict for the United States. The United States military responded to the embassy bombings with Tomahawk missile strikes against suspected terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan launched from ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. In January 1998 the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq denied access to key sites to United Nations weapons inspectors, who left Iraq in December 1998. This led to U.S.-British retaliatory strikes against Iraq in December 1998. In the Pacific, tensions flared in northeast Asia when in September 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over Japan.

Owing to these events and others the United States began to focus much of its military, diplomatic, and economic attention on areas of the world outside Europe. The movement of U.S. Navy assets into various non-European regions clearly indicated a shift away from a Mediterranean emphasis on deployed battle groups. During this same

time, however, the Balkan Peninsula began to experience a new set of problems. “The situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate sharply in early March 1998 when Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) security forces launched a series of strikes to crackdown on the growing Kosovar insurgent movement known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).”³⁴ By the end of March, the United Nations Security Council had passed a resolution “condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms, and training.”³⁵

In the context of this tumultuous geopolitical situation, jointness and interservice competition for resources were once again a major determinant in change. “The early 1990s were also a time of declining budgets, and although General Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had proclaimed that cuts would be shared equally (in percentage terms) by all military services, the Navy, like the Air Force, decided to promote a post-Cold War concept that justified at least a claim for increased budget shares.”³⁶ The Navy had learned lessons from its interoperability problems of the Gulf War, and invested heavily in improving its joint communication systems and building its stocks of precision munitions.³⁷ The lessons of Desert Storm and Deliberate Force showed that the Navy needed to make its doctrine compatible with that of the Air Force in order to continue its role as the preeminent expeditionary arm of the Defense Department. The U.S. Navy and Air Force, as the primary air components within the United States military structure, had the greatest need to work towards a joint air power doctrine. This was especially true as a result of the Clinton Administration’s unwillingness to commit ground forces into non-permissive environments. “They made little progress towards creating ‘ties that bind’; from the end of the Vietnam War to at

³⁴ Department of Defense “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report”

Report to Congress, 31 January 2000. page A-1.

³⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1160 31 March, 1998. Available at www.un.org .

³⁶ Major General John L. Barry, USAF and James Blaker. “After the Storm, The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and Navy” *The Naval War College Review* Autumn 2001 available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art6-au1.htm 24 February 2003.

³⁷ For detailed analysis of the Navy and the other services in Operation Desert Storm (1991), see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little Brown, 1995).

least the mid 1990s, the Air Force and the Navy simply thought about and operated within two separate conceptual worlds.”³⁸

The Air Force recognized the need to add an expeditionary component to its doctrine when it published *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* in 1996. This document acknowledged that the Air Force “had to shift from a reliance on mass to a reliance on knowledge and information. In the end, the Air Force had to do these things because they were the essence of true expeditionary power.”³⁹ The Air Force now became capable of performing one of the Navy’s primary missions. It became an expeditionary, quick reaction force. While the Navy relied on forward deployment for its expeditionary capabilities, the Air Force relied not only on tactical aircraft located in theater, but also on long range stealth aircraft capable of flying precision missions from the continental United States to the Balkans and returning, with multiple mid-air refuelings, in a single sortie.

In response to the Air Force’s new joint expeditionary doctrine, the Navy developed a new doctrine that built upon the *From the Sea* and *Forward From the Sea* concepts. *Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept* was the new doctrine, published by then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson in March 1997. In this new doctrine, jointness was an important theme. In the foreword to the new doctrine Admiral Johnson stated that “We will have an integral role in future joint operations.”⁴⁰ The purpose of the new doctrine was to emphasize the role that naval forces can play in a joint environment while following the three tenets of the *National Military Strategy*: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention.

The first section of the document, “How the Navy Operates,” counters the Air Force’s position that it is the nation’s primary expeditionary force. It states that naval expeditionary forces “are a potent and cost-effective alternative to power projection from the continental United States and are suited ideally for the many contingencies that can be deterred or quickly handled by forward-deployed forces. Expeditionary operations

³⁸ Major General John L. Barry, USAF and James Blaker. “After the Storm, The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and Navy” *The Naval War College Review* Autumn 2001.

³⁹ Major General John L. Barry, USAF and James Blaker. “After the Storm, The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and Navy” *The Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2001.

⁴⁰ *Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*, March 1997 available at www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html 10 March 2003.

complement, enable and dramatically enhance the effectiveness of continental power-projection forces when a larger military response is needed.”⁴¹ The Navy was clearly attempting to defend its position as the leading expeditionary element of the Department of Defense, and to underscore the fact that, especially in a context of overseas basing draw downs, naval forces remain the key to overseas presence, power projection and deterrence.

The section of the document entitled “Peacetime Engagement” indicates that naval forces are ideally suited to supporting diplomatic efforts and building coalitions. “We build confidence in U.S. security pledges by demonstrating our ability to ensure that land-based forces deploying from the continental United States will have ready access to the region in a crisis.”⁴² This statement focuses on the value of expeditionary forces, while alluding to the Navy’s role in preparing the joint battlespace. The doctrine focuses on the ability of naval forces to use precision weaponry and information superiority in shaping the joint battlespace. The role of naval forces in deterring potential adversaries is highlighted in the doctrine as well.

Finally, naval forces can remain on scene after the joint campaign concludes to enforce sanctions and to maintain U.S. presence for regional stability. We prevent the need for yet another joint campaign by taking advantage of our self-sustaining endurance to keep combat credible forces in the region. Our most significant contribution well may be to prevent the next conflict entirely through our forward presence for engagement and deterrence.⁴³

It was with this doctrine that the U.S. Navy entered the second major Balkan combat operation of the 1990s, Operation Allied Force. The new doctrine envisaged future conflict deterrence because of credible forward presence in the wake of a joint operation. However, naval forces failed to prevent a second ethnic conflict in southeastern Europe, despite continued engagement in the area. It is not clear whether this was a failure of the *Forward From the Sea* concepts, or whether the geopolitical

⁴¹ *Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*, March 1997.

⁴² *Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*, March 1997.

⁴³ *Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*, March 1997.

situation in theaters outside Europe prohibited the U.S. Navy from retaining sufficient combat power in the region to successfully deter another war.

The role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in European security as well as the membership of the organization changed in 1995-1999. The new NATO Allies that joined in this period were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Although the admission of these nations was an important step in the transformation of NATO from a Cold War to a post-Cold War security organization, the new Allies contributed little to the Alliance in naval terms. The second major change in the organization was an even greater emphasis on non-Article 5 missions. During the NATO combat operations in Bosnia, the allies acted under the “infamous dual key arrangement under which the UN secretary general (or his designated representative) would have to approve the initiation and scope of any NATO air action.”⁴⁴ During Operation Deliberate Force, NATO provided the combat power, but the United Nations Security Council authorized the action. When Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, the arrangement was different. NATO carried out the action without an explicit authorization of the use of force from the UN Security Council.

The final determinant in the equation was leadership. In 1995-1999, there were some key changes within the leadership of the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense that affected the Navy in Europe. When NATO had been conducting Operation Deliberate Force, the Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Jeremy Michael Boorda. Before rising to the Navy’s top post, Admiral Boorda had extensive command experience in the European theater. In 1987 he commanded the Sixth Fleet. In 1991, when he was promoted to four-star rank, Admiral Boorda assumed the posts of Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) and Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). In this role he was in command of NATO forces in the Balkans.⁴⁵ When Boorda became the CNO in 1994, the Navy had a Europe-focused officer at its head. When Admiral Boorda committed suicide in May 1996, the Navy was left in a state of shock. Admiral Boorda was replaced by Admiral Jay Johnson, an officer with NATO experience, who had been commander of the U.S. Second Fleet and

⁴⁴ Ivo Daalder, *Getting to Dayton* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), p. 23.

⁴⁵ www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/boorda/boordbio.html 9 March 2003.

Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic.⁴⁶ Although Admiral Johnson had been a naval commander within NATO, he did not have as much European experience as his predecessor.

A similar shift in leadership experience occurred within the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this period. From 1993 until 1997, General John Shalikashvili was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was an Army officer with extensive European experience. General Shalikashvili was born in Poland, and his tours as a general officer included assistant division command in Germany, deputy Commander in Chief of U.S. Army forces in Europe, and (immediately before assuming the post as chairman) he was Supreme Allied Commander Europe.⁴⁷ In 1997 General Hugh Shelton replaced General Shalikashvili as Chairman. General Shelton had virtually no experience in the European theater in his career. In contrast with 1995, when the United States Navy participated in Operation Allied Force, its uniformed leadership no longer consisted of officers with extensive European and NATO experience.

During the combat operations in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the military leadership of the United States faced a challenge in balancing the command and control of a NATO operation, while maintaining the United States chain of command. U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, who fulfilled the dual-hatted role as commander of all United States forces in Europe and Supreme Allied Commander, spoke directly to this issue in his book *Waging Modern War*. “There is a legal conundrum, however, in the way that U.S. military advice is given and received. By law, the Joint Chiefs are advisors to the President. But they only can be responsible for U.S. operations or the U.S. component of an Allied operation. The legislation takes no account of the different responsibilities of officers in NATO positions, such as SACEUR.”⁴⁸ Even though the United States provided more combat power than the other 18 NATO member nations, as SACEUR General Clark was required to work with all of the allies in terms of overall strategy.

The United States Navy and its sister services conducted Operation Allied Force (1999) and Operation Deliberate Force (1995) under the same administration. The

⁴⁶ www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/johnson_j/jsnsbio.html 11 March 2003.

⁴⁷ www.armyhistoryfnd.org/armyhists/research 10 March 2003.

⁴⁸ General Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 453.

administration had, however, made some fundamental decisions as to how combat power could be employed which directly affected the role of the Navy in Europe. The missile strikes against suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998, as well as Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in December 1998, were almost entirely naval operations. The strikes against terrorist compounds were “made with cruise missiles, not aircraft. The missiles were fired from ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.”⁴⁹ Operation Desert Fox was also primarily a naval operation. “This operation employs U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flying from the decks of the USS *Enterprise*; Air Force and Royal Air Force aircraft operating from land bases in the region, and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from U.S. Navy ships at sea and United States Air Force B-52s.”⁵⁰ As these examples illustrate, the focus of the Navy’s combat operations rapidly shifted from the Mediterranean and the Sixth Fleet in 1995 to the Middle East and the Central Command (CENTCOM) by 1998, only to return temporarily to the Mediterranean for Operation Allied Force in 1999.

The leadership of the United States was increasingly relying on both sea and land-based air power. This reliance would most affect the U.S. military in the period leading up to Operation Allied Force, when the Clinton Administration refused to consider the use of ground troops in Kosovo. The United States would only endorse the use of NATO ground troops in Kosovo in a permissive environment. President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore were adamant on this point. On 24 March 1999, President Clinton stated “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.” Vice President Gore then stated authoritatively on 9 April, “That option is not under consideration.”⁵¹ The Navy and the Air Force shouldered the burden in the Kosovo air campaign. Because of competing priorities in the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. force structure in place in the Mediterranean was severely taxed. According to Vice Admiral Daniel Murphy, U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander During Operation Allied Force:

⁴⁹ “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan” 20 August 1998, www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.01/

⁵⁰ www.defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox/ 11 March 2003.

⁵¹ Clinton and Gore quoted in Ivo Daalder, *Winning Ugly: NATO’S War to Save Kosovo* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), p. 130.

The sharing of carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships and submarines between the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf is something we must do in order to balance our precious and limited resources against competing requirements. There are simply not enough carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups and submarines in the navy to meet global tasking. These critical assets are essentially time-shared between theaters. ...Last year's CVBG [carrier battle group] presence in the Mediterranean totaled only 40 percent of the CINCEUR requirement and little more than half the fair share objective.⁵²

A. THE U.S. NAVY AND OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: 24 MARCH – 10 JUNE 1999

In the preceding section, the individual determinants of change were examined in a general manner. This section examines specific issues in the Kosovo campaign as they relate directly to the U.S. Navy. The first of these issues is once again geopolitics. The second issue was the inter-theater competition for major resources, which came to a head in the Kosovo campaign and the service most affected was the U.S. Navy. Another geopolitical factor in naval operations during the conflict was the possible deployment of Russian naval assets to the Mediterranean during the campaign.

By 1998, the military strategy of the United States clearly assumed that the two potential theaters of major regional conflict would be the Middle East and East Asia. This strategy further removed Europe from the forefront of military planning. General Wesley Clark described the problems faced by his predecessor as CINCEUR, General George Joulwan, as follows: "This was a major planning effort, from a theater that we had deliberately left out of the list of regional contingencies in the National Military Strategy, despite General Joulwan's pleas. He argued repeatedly that if we didn't assign to his theater an 'MRC' [Major Regional Contingency] designation, he would lose his priority on resources. And since the time of Eisenhower, we had always looked on the NATO mission and our Alliance in Europe as our top priority."⁵³

The issue of regional force structure came to a head regarding the employment of the aircraft carrier USS *Theodore Roosevelt*. The European Command this time had to

⁵² Testimony of Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Commander United States Sixth Fleet, before the Senate Armed Services Sea Power Subcommittee, 13 October 1999, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, available at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

⁵³ General Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 48.

constantly provide resources to the Central Command because aircraft based in Turkey conducted Operation Northern Watch, the enforcement of the northern no-fly zone over Iraq. A debate ensued between the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command as to which theater had the priority for resources. General Clark wanted the *Theodore Roosevelt* assigned to his command. The Navy simply did not have the resources to completely fulfill the requirements of both theaters. According to General Clark, there was “a revealing article in *The Washington Times*, which described a tug of war between the European Command and the Central Command over the aircraft carrier *Theodore Roosevelt*. It was probably a leak by the Navy, to justify the importance of its carriers.”⁵⁴ In the end, the carrier was eventually assigned to Operation Allied Force, and contributed significantly to its success.

The other geopolitical issue was the possible deployment of a Russian naval group from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. This presented both a military and a diplomatic concern to NATO. The Russians demonstrated their seriousness because “they had notified the Turks of their intent to pass through the Dardenelles from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean in early April. It was an unmistakable signal.”⁵⁵ Although a Russian battle group deployment would cause concern, it would not be a “war stopper.” The seriousness of the situation was evident in General Clark’s order to Admiral James Ellis (CINCSOUTH) to “be prepared to implement a naval exclusion zone to keep the Russian naval vessels from interfering with us.”⁵⁶ The potential deployment never materialized. Russia did manage to deploy an intelligence collection vessel and a single Oscar-class submarine, the *Kursk*. The impact on the Alliance’s operations was minimal.⁵⁷

The second issue to explore is the direct role that U.S. naval forces had in the combat operations. The U.S. Navy was able to contribute significantly to Operation Allied Force because of various capabilities. The Navy had invested heavily in precision-guided munitions in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Because the weather

⁵⁴ General Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 240.

⁵⁵ General Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 212.

⁵⁶ General Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 226.

⁵⁷ Mikhail Tsypkin, *Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy 1992 –2002* (Camberley, England : Conflict Studies Research Center, December 2002), p. 8.

conditions over Kosovo were often severe, ship-launched Tomahawk missiles were often the only weapons available to maintain pressure on Serbia. “In Kosovo, NATO forces operated under conditions in which there was at least 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time.”⁵⁸ As a result of the weather conditions, satellite-guided TLAMs were often the weapon of choice. A total of 218 sea-launched cruise missiles were fired from United States and British warships. TLAMs were also considered the weapon of choice in areas where collateral damage was a major consideration.⁵⁹ The high use rates of Tomahawk missiles, in the Kosovo campaign as well as in CENTCOM’s Desert Fox and the U.S. attacks on terrorist camps, meant that by the end of the Kosovo campaign, a shortage of missiles existed. This prompted the U.S. Navy to seek emergency funding for missile conversions in order to ensure an adequate supply to the fleet.⁶⁰ Operation Allied Force was a proving ground for the use of sea-launched Tomahawk missiles as a tactical weapon. The Tomahawk was used for the first time against mobile targets, whereas in the past its use had been only against fixed targets. “In fact, Allied Force saw the successful realization of TLAM as a tactical weapon.”⁶¹

In addition to cruise missile strikes, the naval services provided two capabilities that were not present elsewhere in the American military arsenal. The first is the virtual monopoly of the Navy and Marine Corps in the electronic attack mission because of their EA-6B aircraft, another asset which was taxed to its limits by worldwide commitments. The second capability was for quick reaction strike missions. If a target needed to be struck immediately, the task was given to the Navy. “Two systems could do it: the carrier air wing and the Tomahawk. Nothing else could, and that’s just a fact, and General Clark would validate that.”⁶²

⁵⁸ Department of Defense “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report” Report to Congress, 31 January, 2000. p. 86.

⁵⁹ Department of Defense “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report” Report to Congress, 31 January, 2000. p. 92.

⁶⁰ Jeff Coles, “U.S. Navy Fears a Weapons Shortage – Kosovo Conflict Continues to Drain Missile Supply; Congress is Approached,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 April 1999.

⁶¹ Department of Defense “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report” Report to Congress, 31 January, 2000. page 97.

⁶² Vice Admiral Dan Murphy, quoted in *Air Force Magazine Online*, December 1999 Volume 82, No.

The amphibious component of the deployed naval forces, the Marine Corps units embarked on amphibious ships, also made important contributions to the operation. The embarked Marines provided a ready source of ground troops to the operations should they be called upon, but the true contribution of these units in this conflict resided in their ability to provide additional security to United States interests in Macedonia, notably humanitarian assistance. “During the Kosovo operation, the CINC designated the JTF [Joint Task Force] commander, who in turn designated the deployed Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to act as a humanitarian assessment team.”⁶³

In this role, the Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit provided security to refugees displaced to Macedonia. “As the refugee flow shifted to Albania the ARG/MEU [Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit] moved from the Aegean to the Adriatic and commenced AV-8B strike sorties into Kosovo. Simultaneously, 24 MEU Marines teamed with MH-53 helicopters from USS *Inchon* to distribute supplies and build refugee camps in Albania.”⁶⁴ The role of the Marine Corps in providing humanitarian assistance proved the utility of the ARG/MEU team in diverse missions which could be assigned by the joint force commander. Once the hostilities concluded, the Marine Corps proved its role as an effective expeditionary force, as the 26th MEU was the United States’ military ground force contribution to the Initial Entry Force. The Marines set the stage for the heavier Army forces that followed as the Kosovo peacekeeping force was established on the ground.⁶⁵

B. CONCLUSION

The period 1995 -1999 was a time of change for the United States Navy and its role as an instrument of U.S. security policy in Europe. Changing geopolitical priorities combined with a shrinking force structure made it difficult to maintain the required

www.afa.org/magazine/Dec1999/1299navy.html 8 March 2003.

⁶³ Department of Defense “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report”
Report to Congress, 31 January, 2000. page 105.

⁶⁴ Testimony of Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Commander United States Sixth Fleet, before the Senate Armed Services Sea Power Subcommittee, 13 October 1999.

⁶⁵ Testimony of Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Commander United States Sixth Fleet, before the Senate Armed Services Sea Power Subcommittee, 13 October 1999.

carrier coverage in all theaters. The ongoing dispute between combatant commanders over the deployment of battle groups in the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea came to a head when the Kosovo campaign began and insufficient carrier force structure existed to conduct Operation Southern Watch and Operation Allied Force simultaneously. In 1995, the United States Navy had 392 active duty warships. By 1999, the number had dropped to 352 warships. This represented the lowest number of ships since 1938.⁶⁶ This decrease was a significant factor in the ability of the Navy to provide the EUCOM-requested ship deployments in the face of a continued change in planning emphasis on the Middle East and East Asia.

During the period, the Navy and Marine Corps team moved significantly towards more jointness with their sister services. Operation Allied Force was a success story in terms of the ability of the air arms of the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force to work together in shaping the joint battlespace. When the Kosovo campaign came to a conclusion, however, the future role of the Navy in European security was once again in question. The military planners of the United States once again directed emphasis towards other theaters. No new major threats to U.S. security interests in Europe were present. Although Russia had suspended various forms of cooperation and dialogue with NATO at the outset of the Alliance's Kosovo air campaign in March 1999, Moscow decided in early 2000 to resume meetings of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council with an agenda broader than peacekeeping in the Balkans. The Alliance continued to cultivate improved relations with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region via Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

⁶⁶ All ship/ force structure numbers are from the Navy Historical Center Website. *U.S. Active Navy Ship Force Levels, 1917- .* www.history.navy.mil 8 December 2002.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. FROM OPERATION ALLIED FORCE TO THE WAR ON TERROR: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1999-2003

The end of combat operations in Operation Allied Force marked another adjustment in the scale of involvement of the U.S. military in European security issues. Although the United States continues to contribute significantly to peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and Bosnia, few threats to U.S. security interests in Europe are foreseen in the near future. World geopolitical events in the 1999-2003 period, notably the war on terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Afghanistan, shifted the focus of United States military assets even further from European issues than they had been previously. European nations and the NATO Alliance continued to change their command and force structures to support more expeditionary operations in order to remain relevant as military institutions. Moreover, during this period, ballistic missile threats to both Europe and the United States led to renewed debate about the usefulness of ballistic missile defense. The period between the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the conclusion of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom (1 May 2003) began with unprecedented support for the United States from its European Allies, including the first ever invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (which began on 19 March 2003) were, however, fraught with disagreements among NATO nations over the legitimacy of the use of force in Iraq. These disagreements seemed to separate the United States from many of its traditional Allies as much as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks had united them.

This chapter continues to describe and analyzes the role of the U.S. Navy as an instrument to advance and defend U.S. security interests in Europe. The analysis considers the same determinants examined in previous chapters. Special emphasis is placed on the relationships between the United States and its European Allies during the 1999-2003 period, and on the role of geopolitics in shaping the U.S. force structure further away from a Eurocentric emphasis. U.S. forces are increasingly designed to operate globally, rather than regionally, to counter the rise of new transnational threats to U.S. security.

In past chapters, the determinant of geopolitics has been examined as a security issue. The dwindling U.S. military presence in Europe has been attributed specifically to assessments of a declining military security threat. While the demise of the Soviet Union and the completion of combat operations in the Balkans were certainly grounds for a decreased U.S. military presence, economic factors must also be considered. During the 1990s, Mediterranean Europe, the region in which the U.S. Navy has conducted the vast majority of its European deployments, has steadily declined in its relative economic importance to the United States.

In the early 1970s, the entire Mediterranean Basin –that is, the countries with Mediterranean coastline–accounted for approximately 10 percent of all U.S. trade (exports and imports combined). Since then, the Mediterranean’s percentage has steadily declined. During the last five years for which data are available (1994-1998), its share has been in the 6.8-7.3 percent range. The high end of the range represents a 25 percent reduction over nearly three decades, the low end a drop of fully one-third. These reductions in the relative position of the Mediterranean region reflect the dramatic increases that have taken place in U.S. trade with other regions, particularly the Pacific Rim and other parts of North America. These data suggest that despite significant increases in absolute values, relative to other parts of the world the Mediterranean region has become significantly less important in economic terms to the United States.⁶⁷

One of the primary purposes of forward deployed naval forces is to keep open sea lines of communication to ensure unrestricted trade between the United States and its partners. Considering the evolving security tasks and the declining importance of Mediterranean Europe as a percentage of U.S. trade, a shift in emphasis, force structure, and forward deployments towards the Middle East and the Far East makes economic and military sense for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces.

The terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001 changed the geopolitical outlook of the entire world, and caused the United States to reevaluate its strategy of predetermined regional deployments. The U.S. Sixth Fleet, historically

⁶⁷ James F. Miskel, “Being there Matters – But Where,” *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2001, available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2001/Summer/art2-su1.htm 24 February 2003.

responsible for the Mediterranean region, was forced to transfer many of its afloat assets to the Central Command area of responsibility in the Middle East in order to support Operation Enduring Freedom, specifically the military operations against the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, beginning in October 2001. In a show of support for the United States following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the NATO Alliance invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the Alliance's history. One of the most visible deployments of NATO forces in the immediate post-11 September 2001 aftermath was the deployment of the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean to the eastern Mediterranean. Although the initial deployments of NATO assets to the area began on 6 October 2001, Operation Active Endeavor officially began on 26 October 2001. The purpose of Operation Active Endeavor was and would continue to be "to conduct naval operations in the Mediterranean to actively demonstrate NATO's resolve and solidarity. Operation Active Endeavor is one of the measures resulting from NATO's decision to implement Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."⁶⁸

Since the beginning of Operation Active Endeavor in October 2001, the mission of the assigned forces has been expanded, and the operation has taken on a more permanent nature. In order to maintain continuous presence, the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean have rotated duties with the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic enabling NATO to maintain continuous surveillance of suspect merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. In February 2003, the operation expanded to include the escort of Allied merchant vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar. The operation took an even more active role by initiating boarding operations against suspect vessels on 29 April 2003. "The North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's highest decision-making body, decided to extend NATO's maritime operations in the Mediterranean to include boarding operations against suspected terrorist activities in the Mediterranean."⁶⁹ The expansion of the operation has a two-fold meaning for the United States and its naval forces. First, the operation enables more U.S. assets to leave Mediterranean Europe to conduct operations in the Central Command area. Second, the operation is a visible sign of international

⁶⁸ "Operation Active Endeavor," available at www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/Endeavour/Endeavour.htm 27 July 2003.

⁶⁹ "NATO Ships Start Boarding Operations in Mediterranean," available at www.afsouth.nato.int/releases/2003/PR_11_03.htm 27 July 2003.

support for the United States in the war against terrorism, regardless of the political differences among NATO members about supporting United States operations against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.

A second example of Allied cooperation in what U.S. officials call the Global War on Terrorism, regardless of the political disputes over the war in Iraq, is NATO taking on the leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, in August 2003. This deployment is especially significant as it is the first time that the Alliance has conducted a mission outside the Euro-Atlantic region. General Sir Jack Deverell, the NATO commander of ISAF forces, said that this deployment was “a milestone in NATO’s development representing a real break from the NATO of the past to an Alliance which is more relevant and has greater utility in the uncertain security environment of the future.”⁷⁰ The deployment is significant as it shows NATO’s resolve to transform itself into a military organization that is relevant in the current geopolitical situation.

The U.S. government’s assessment of current geopolitical threats was evidenced on 6 February 2002, when the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, gave testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence entitled “Worldwide Threat – Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World.” Although a threat to European interests from terrorist organizations is mentioned, almost all of the testimony deals with the Middle East and other areas of the Muslim world. Scant attention is paid to threats in Europe, with the exception of a continued threat to peacekeeping forces deployed in the Balkans, a threat that Tenet ties to the war on terrorism. “U.S. and other international forces are most at risk in Bosnia, where Islamic extremists from outside the region played an important role in the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s.”⁷¹

Tenet testified that the gravest danger facing the United States had become the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes and non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups. In the DCI’s testimony Russia is indicated as a primary

⁷⁰ Deverell quoted in “NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission,” available at www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/08-august/e0811a.htm 11 August 2003.

⁷¹ “DCI Worldwide Threat Briefing 2002: Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World,” available at www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02062002.html

threat to security, not because it poses a danger in itself, but as a possible source for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. “Russian entities continue to provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW, BW, nuclear, and ballistic and cruise missile projects.”⁷² During the entirety of the Cold War, the threat of weapons of mass destruction came from states that could be deterred by a strategy of threatening retaliation in kind, at least with regard to nuclear and chemical weapons, if necessary. In the post-11 September 2001 security environment the United States has placed greater public emphasis on the strategic option of preemptive action and on operations in areas outside Europe. This could further reduce the number of forces the United States could commit to Europe.

The relationship between the United States and its European allies during the 1999-2003 period was dynamic and uneven. It included both unprecedented cooperation in the war on terror, and dissent from many traditional allies regarding the legitimacy and/or utility of the preventive war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in March-April 2003. During the Gulf War in 1990-1991, many nations provided combat forces to the multinational effort to remove the Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, Poland and the United Kingdom were the only European NATO members who contributed combat forces.

One episode that prompted some controversy in relations among the NATO Allies was the request by the Turkish government that its Allies take steps to prepare for the defense of Turkish territory once war with Iraq appeared imminent. Much political debate among member nations ensued. In the end, the Alliance’s Defense Planning Committee (a body in which France prefers not to participate) agreed to undertake the planning and related work for deployment of theater missile defenses, chemical and biological warfare defenses, and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Turkey.

The structure of United States forces in Europe also began to change dramatically during the period. U.S. naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean were used to directly attack Iraq. During the first Persian Gulf War, U.S. warships patrolled the Mediterranean, but over-flight rights and other political factors prohibited any carrier-

⁷²“DCI Worldwide Threat Briefing 2002: Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World,” available at www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02062002.html

launched strikes from the Mediterranean.⁷³ During Operation Iraqi Freedom, direct combat action came in the form of strikes from carrier-based aircraft and Tomahawk-carrying surface combatants located in the Eastern Mediterranean. “During the war, the Mediterranean was a busy place. Two Navy carrier strike groups, centered around the USS *Harry S. Truman* and the USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, launched strike aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles into Iraq.”⁷⁴ This activity was one of the first steps in a strategy of not viewing the European theater as a primary area of combat operations, but rather as a base or “lily pad” from which operations into more volatile areas of the world could be launched.

Two events in 2003 indicated that the United States was changing its attitude towards the structure and leadership of its forces assigned to Europe: first, the selection of the first-ever Marine Corps officer as the Combatant Commander for the U.S. European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe; and, second, a shift in ground force deployments away from the traditional U.S. garrisons in Germany towards Eastern Europe. Moreover, European-based U.S. forces have begun to increase their attention to contingencies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Marine General James Jones assumed his role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in January 2003. “Jones, a former U.S. Marine Corps commandant who was born in Paris and speaks fluent French, also heads the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), making him a key player in synching NATO and Pentagon transformation efforts.”⁷⁵ In June 2003, at the direction of the North Atlantic Council, a new functional command, the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), was established. ACT is commanded by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, USN, who serves as Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation. This move eliminated the Alliance’s Atlantic Command, consolidated all NATO forces under a single operational command, and moved all NATO naval forces under the direction of SACEUR. When questioned about a

⁷³ Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S. Warships Eye Eastern Mediterranean for Iraq War Role,” *The Washington Post*, 13 January 2003.

⁷⁴ David Brown, “Aquidneck Probes Iraqi Shipwrecks for Arms, Spies,” available at www.navyleague.org/sea_power/aug_03_27.php 28 August 2003.

⁷⁵ Interview with General James Jones, *Defense News*, 4 August 2003.

Marine Corps officer being chosen for the command, General Jones responded as follows.

I have a background in Europe, I was raised here, I have an affinity for NATO, I think it's very important for the future. The Marine Corps is a very transformational organization. It's very expeditionary. It has been in the integrated combined arms business for 40 or 50 years. And if those who decided they wanted me to come here think that's a good idea, then I'm happy to be here because that's what I know how to do.⁷⁶

The choice of a commander who has European and expeditionary experience, and who is a great proponent of transformation, is indicative of the new U.S. strategy in favor of transforming force structures throughout NATO, and shifting away from permanent garrisons of forward deployed forces in Europe to security provided by expeditionary forces, with a further emphasis on jointness.

The Alliance recognized the growing importance of expeditionary forces when at the Prague Summit in November 2002, the NATO Heads of State and Government decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF will be a military structure "consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly wherever is needed, as decided by the Council."⁷⁷ The decision to create this force was a positive step by the NATO political leadership in recognizing the utility of establishing an expeditionary force for potential use within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. The force is to serve as a model for transformation of NATO forces, and is expected to have attained initial operational capability by October 2004.

The decision by U.S. military and political leaders to change the forward deployment of U.S. forces to make them more relevant to current security conditions includes a new emphasis on operations in Africa, most of which lies within the U.S. European Command's area of responsibility. The August-September 2003 deployment of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces towards Liberia is an example of such a shift. Using

⁷⁶ Interview with General James Jones, *Defense News*, 4 August 2003.

⁷⁷ Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, par. 4a, available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127.htm 29 August 2003.

bases within Europe as a “lily pad” for operations outside has Europe gained support since 2001. General Jones explained his position on this issue as follows:

I said that we need to find different terms and so we found different terms. We’re talking about hubs and lily pads and things that were visually relevant, but as a formal term are not very useful. So we have been engaged in developing a series of iterative briefings to propose a transformation of our European footprint for a number of years. The terms used now are joint main-operating bases, joint forward-operating bases, and joint forward-operating locations.⁷⁸

In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, USN released an entirely new doctrine for naval forces, *Sea Power 21*. Unlike past doctrines that were oriented towards defeating known, identifiable threats, the new doctrine does not focus on any particular region of the world. Instead, the new doctrine emphasizes the ability of the U.S. Navy to project its power anywhere it is needed in the world, against all types of potential enemies, and calls for a joint force structure. According to the doctrine, naval forces will

continue the evolution of U.S. naval power from the blue-water, war-at-sea focus of the “Maritime Strategy”(1986) through the littoral emphasis of “... From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward ...from the Sea” (1994), to a broadened strategy in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers.⁷⁹

The *Sea Power 21* doctrine has three principal cornerstones: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. The Sea Strike portion of the doctrine focuses on power projection. It includes precision weaponry, further integration into a joint warfighting architecture, and the introduction of new technologies into the fleet. Sea Strike envisions using the advantage of the sovereign nature of naval forces to project power wherever it is needed, regardless of the willingness of other nations to provide support or to allow U.S. ground or air forces in their territories.

Sea Shield is the defensive portion of the doctrine, and one of its primary focuses is the ability of naval forces to provide missile defense from the sea. This is a change in the employment strategy of the defensive capability inherent in naval units. “Traditionally, naval defense has protected the unit, the fleet and sea lines of

⁷⁸ Interview with General James Jones, *Defense News*, 4 August 2003.

⁷⁹ “Sea Power 21 Series –Part 1, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, October 2002 available at www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm 24 July 2003.

communication.” Sea Shield shifts this orientation “beyond unit and task-force defense to provide the nation with sea-based theater and strategic defense.”⁸⁰ In an era in which land-based forward deployed U.S. forces are being drawn down, this new defense is expected to move the defense of Allies and the U.S. homeland into forward theaters.

The third major pillar of the doctrine is Sea Basing. This pillar rests on the presumption that the world’s oceans provide huge areas in which to conduct operational maneuvers. “As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows and the availability of overseas bases declines, it is compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea bases.”⁸¹ The three pillars of the *Sea Power 21* doctrine are clearly consistent with the strategic plan of the European Command as stated by its commander, General James Jones, USMC, to make the U.S. forces in Europe more expeditionary and less tethered to territorial defense.

The Sea Shield portion of the doctrine deals with ballistic missile defense, a controversial issue in the relationship between the United States and its European Allies. These issues include liability for falling debris, technological feasibility, and the fact that “the European allies do not share the sense of an imminent missile threat felt by the United States – despite parts of southern Europe being already in range of ballistic missiles located in North Africa and the Middle East.”⁸² While the Clinton Administration was against the deployment of large-scale national missile defense systems, President George W. Bush has championed missile defense for the protection of the U.S. homeland since the 2000 presidential campaign.

The desire of the Bush administration to create a missile defense system for the protection of the U.S. homeland created a split between the United States and its European Allies because of the concept of shared risk, and its impact on maintaining the security of NATO members in Europe.

⁸⁰“ Sea Power 21 Series –Part 1, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” *Proceedings*, October 2002, available at www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm 24 July 2003.

⁸¹ “Sea Power 21 Series –Part 1, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” *Proceedings*, October 2002, available at www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm 24 July 2003.

⁸² Wyn Q. Bowen, “Missile Defense and the Transatlantic Security Relationship,” *International Affairs*, vol. 77 no.3 (July 2001), p. 494.

There was anxiety that if the United States acquired some protection against missile attacks, but Europe remained vulnerable, this could undermine the concept of shared risk and America's extended deterrence and security commitments to Europe, based for decades on the presence of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons on European soil.⁸³

This anxiety was assuaged when it became clear to the Allies that the United States supported the development and deployment of missile defenses for the protection of all NATO homelands. In November 2002 at the Prague Summit the Allies decided to:

Examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along with deterrence. Today we initiated a new NATO Missile Defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats, which we will continue to assess.⁸⁴

In a period in which the United States is clearly drawing down its force structure on European soil, the deployment of a sea-based theater missile defense as envisioned in *Sea Power 21* could help the United States maintain deterrence and defense for its Allies and interests in Europe. In the current security environment, in which the most immediate missile threat comes not from Russia, but from the Middle East and North Africa, the deployment of sea-based missile defenses could contribute to maintaining U.S. security commitments in a dynamic threat environment.

Between 1999 and 2003, the U.S. Navy was an extremely active forward deployed force that continued to move its emphasis away from Europe and the Mediterranean and towards the Middle East and Asia. The leadership of both the Secretary of Defense and the European Command Combatant Commander reinforced the dedication to the desired transformation of American military forces to a joint and expeditionary posture capable of worldwide reach. The European members of NATO

⁸³ Wyn Q. Bowen, "Missile Defense and the Transatlantic Security Relationship," p. 497.

⁸⁴ Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, par. 4g, available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127.htm 29 August 2003.

have recognized this shift in U.S. global military doctrine, and they are reshaping their forces in order to enhance their utility in meeting the challenges at hand.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

Between 1986 and 2003, the U.S. Navy adapted and evolved in its role as an instrument of securing U.S. interests in Europe, leading to changes in both force structure and doctrine. This thesis concludes that four factors appear to have been the main determinants of these changes: (1) geopolitics, including changes in the political and security environment in Europe; (2) inter-service competition for resources, influenced by congressionally mandated jointness in military operations; (3) the influence of key policy-makers in the United States political and military command structure, including the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of both the executive and the legislative branches; and (4) relations between the United States and its NATO Allies.

Three periods are analyzed in this thesis. The first period, 1986 to 1995, includes the end of the Cold War, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and significant changes in the resources devoted by the United States to defense, notably in Europe. The second period, 1995-1999, included more substantial force structure changes, and Operation Allied Force, NATO's first large-scale combat operation. The third period, 1999-2003, included unprecedented cooperation between the NATO Allies, major shifts in doctrine and force structure towards increased jointness, and forces more capable of expeditionary operations. The 1999-2003 period included a major geopolitical change in which the major threat to security became terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region. During each period certain determinants were more influential than others, but all contributed to shaping doctrine and force structure.

During the 1986-1995 period, the end of the Cold War led to inter-service competition for dwindling defense resources. The U.S. Navy's doctrine at the beginning of the period, the *Maritime Strategy*, was designed to defeat the Soviet Union in the event of war; and it was a strategy specific to naval warfare, with scant attention paid to joint operations. In 1992, the U.S. Navy published a new doctrine, *From the Sea*, and began to shift its emphasis from open-ocean operations to projecting power ashore. By the end of the period, the U.S. military presence in Europe had been reduced by over two-thirds, and the Middle East had become the focal point of a larger percentage of U.S. military operations. The jointness congressionally mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and

decisions by the military and political leadership of the United States also led to changes in the role of the U.S. Navy in European security.

Two major military actions in the Balkans, Operation Deliberate Force (August-September 1995) and Operation Allied Force (March-June 1999) temporarily transferred the emphasis of U.S. naval forces back towards the Euro-Atlantic region, but even in the midst of combat operations, controversy over the allocation of U.S. military capabilities between Europe and other regions persisted. Terrorist attacks against two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, the continuing threat posed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and a growing nuclear threat from North Korea led the United States to deploy a large percentage of its naval forces away from Europe. In 1997, the U.S. Navy built upon *From the Sea* with a new doctrine, *Forward From the Sea*, which placed even greater emphasis on joint operations than its predecessor. The unwillingness of the Clinton Administration to commit ground forces to operations in non-permissive environments resulted in an increased emphasis on naval and air forces to carry out combat operations. That policy, combined with the lessons of Operation Desert Storm and the operations in the Balkans, resulted in increased jointness, especially between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force.

The conclusion of combat in Operation Allied Force marked another shift in U.S. military strategy towards Europe. No new major threats to Europe were foreseen in the near future. Geopolitical events in the 1999-2003 period, notably the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, and the renewed threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea once again shifted attention away from Europe towards the Middle East and Asia. The terrorist attacks against the United States resulted in the first invocation in history of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and unprecedented cooperation between the NATO Allies followed.

A visible sign of this cooperation was Operation Active Endeavor. This operation included the deployment of a NATO naval task force to the eastern Mediterranean to show NATO solidarity and to maintain surveillance of suspect shipping in the Mediterranean. In February 2003, the operation expanded to include the escort of Allied merchant ships through the Straits of Gibraltar. As a result, the security provided to Europe by naval forces rests more with Allied units, freeing U.S. naval forces to conduct

operations against terrorism outside the Euro-Atlantic region. Unfortunately, the unprecedented support provided to the United States in the war on terrorism was tempered by the attitudes of certain NATO Allies (Belgium, France and Germany) regarding the U.S.-led military campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in March-April 2003.

In 2003, the U.S. Navy published a new doctrine, *Sea Power 21*. The new doctrine does not focus on any particular geographic area, but instead emphasizes the ability of the U.S. Navy to contribute globally to joint operations, and to deal with regional and ballistic missile threats. The importance of a shift towards more expeditionary force structures was also acknowledged by the NATO Alliance with the decision at the November 2002 Prague Summit to create the NATO Response Force. The selection for the first time of a U.S. Marine Corps officer to command the U.S. European Command is indicative of a shift towards an expeditionary force structure for the defense of U.S. interests in Europe and beyond, as permanently forward deployed ground forces in Europe are to be further reduced.

Between 1986 and 2003, the U.S. Navy's doctrine and force structure shifted from a Euro-centric Cold War posture designed for open-ocean operations towards a more balanced global-oriented force designed to deal with contingencies in any region of the world. Moreover, the U.S. Navy's doctrine changed from a service-oriented approach to a joint strategy. Geopolitics, the inter-service competition for resources, the influence of key United States policy makers, and the relations between the United States and its NATO Allies all contributed to shaping doctrine and force structure during this era.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Professor David S. Yost
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Professor Kenneth J. Hagan
Naval War College
Monterey, California
5. Professor James J. Wirtz
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California